mirror of
https://github.com/Qortal/pirate-librustzcash.git
synced 2025-02-12 01:55:48 +00:00
Relocate circuit components for intuitive code paths.
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00ee962429
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@ -127,35 +127,6 @@ fn expose_value_commitment<E, CS>(
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impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
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fn synthesize<CS: ConstraintSystem<E>>(self, cs: &mut CS) -> Result<(), SynthesisError>
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{
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{
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let value_bits = expose_value_commitment(
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cs.namespace(|| "value commitment"),
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self.value_commitment,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Compute nk = [nsk] ProofGenerationKey
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let nk;
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{
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// Witness nsk as bits
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let nsk = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "nsk"),
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self.proof_generation_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.nsk.clone())
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)?;
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// NB: We don't ensure that the bit representation of nsk
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// is "in the field" (Fs) because it's not used except to
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// demonstrate the prover knows it. If they know a
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// congruency then that's equivalent.
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// Compute nk = [nsk] ProvingPublicKey
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nk = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of nk"),
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FixedGenerators::ProofGenerationKey,
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&nsk,
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self.params
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)?;
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}
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// Prover witnesses ak (ensures that it's on the curve)
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// Prover witnesses ak (ensures that it's on the curve)
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let ak = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
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let ak = ecc::EdwardsPoint::witness(
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cs.namespace(|| "ak"),
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cs.namespace(|| "ak"),
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@ -171,14 +142,6 @@ impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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self.params
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self.params
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)?;
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)?;
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// Unpack ak and rk for input to BLAKE2s
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// This is the "viewing key" preimage for CRH^ivk
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let mut ivk_preimage = vec![];
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ivk_preimage.extend(
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ak.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of ak"))?
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);
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// Rerandomize ak and expose it as an input to the circuit
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// Rerandomize ak and expose it as an input to the circuit
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{
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{
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let ar = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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let ar = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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@ -203,6 +166,37 @@ impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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rk.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "rk"))?;
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rk.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "rk"))?;
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}
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}
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// Compute nk = [nsk] ProofGenerationKey
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let nk;
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{
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// Witness nsk as bits
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let nsk = boolean::field_into_boolean_vec_le(
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cs.namespace(|| "nsk"),
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self.proof_generation_key.as_ref().map(|k| k.nsk.clone())
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)?;
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// NB: We don't ensure that the bit representation of nsk
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// is "in the field" (Fs) because it's not used except to
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// demonstrate the prover knows it. If they know a
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// congruency then that's equivalent.
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// Compute nk = [nsk] ProvingPublicKey
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nk = ecc::fixed_base_multiplication(
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cs.namespace(|| "computation of nk"),
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FixedGenerators::ProofGenerationKey,
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&nsk,
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self.params
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)?;
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}
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// This is the "viewing key" preimage for CRH^ivk
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let mut ivk_preimage = vec![];
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// Place ak in the preimage for CRH^ivk
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ivk_preimage.extend(
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ak.repr(cs.namespace(|| "representation of ak"))?
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);
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// This is the nullifier preimage for PRF^nf
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// This is the nullifier preimage for PRF^nf
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let mut nf_preimage = vec![];
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let mut nf_preimage = vec![];
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@ -265,6 +259,14 @@ impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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self.params
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self.params
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)?;
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)?;
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// Expose the value commitment and get the
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// bits of the value (in little endian order)
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let value_bits = expose_value_commitment(
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cs.namespace(|| "value commitment"),
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self.value_commitment,
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self.params
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)?;
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// Compute note contents
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// Compute note contents
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// value (in big endian) followed by g_d and pk_d
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// value (in big endian) followed by g_d and pk_d
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let mut note_contents = vec![];
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let mut note_contents = vec![];
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@ -315,8 +317,6 @@ impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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)?;
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)?;
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}
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}
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let tree_depth = self.auth_path.len();
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// This will store (least significant bit first)
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// This will store (least significant bit first)
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// the position of the note in the tree, for use
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// the position of the note in the tree, for use
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// in nullifier computation.
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// in nullifier computation.
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@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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// point in the prime order subgroup.
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// point in the prime order subgroup.
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let mut cur = cm.get_x().clone();
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let mut cur = cm.get_x().clone();
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// Ascend the merkle tree authentication path
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for (i, e) in self.auth_path.into_iter().enumerate() {
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for (i, e) in self.auth_path.into_iter().enumerate() {
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let cs = &mut cs.namespace(|| format!("merkle tree hash {}", i));
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let cs = &mut cs.namespace(|| format!("merkle tree hash {}", i));
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@ -373,8 +374,6 @@ impl<'a, E: JubjubEngine> Circuit<E> for Spend<'a, E> {
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)?.get_x().clone(); // Injective encoding
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)?.get_x().clone(); // Injective encoding
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}
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}
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assert_eq!(position_bits.len(), tree_depth);
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// Expose the anchor
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// Expose the anchor
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cur.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "anchor"))?;
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cur.inputize(cs.namespace(|| "anchor"))?;
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@ -617,18 +616,18 @@ fn test_input_circuit_with_bls12_381() {
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assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
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assert!(cs.is_satisfied());
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assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 98776);
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assert_eq!(cs.num_constraints(), 98776);
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assert_eq!(cs.hash(), "e6d326669533baf3f771267e86bd752b246184d34b1f2a68f9a6b9283f42e325");
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assert_eq!(cs.hash(), "729850617d4e6d95cbf348f07cbe0c63b01d35718f24cbcf7df79e2c3e1a7648");
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let expected_value_cm = value_commitment.cm(params).into_xy();
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assert_eq!(cs.num_inputs(), 8);
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assert_eq!(cs.num_inputs(), 8);
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(0, "ONE"), Fr::one());
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(0, "ONE"), Fr::one());
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(1, "value commitment/commitment point/x/input variable"), expected_value_cm.0);
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(2, "value commitment/commitment point/y/input variable"), expected_value_cm.1);
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let rk = viewing_key.rk(ar, params).into_xy();
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let rk = viewing_key.rk(ar, params).into_xy();
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(3, "rk/x/input variable"), rk.0);
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(1, "rk/x/input variable"), rk.0);
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(4, "rk/y/input variable"), rk.1);
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(2, "rk/y/input variable"), rk.1);
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let expected_value_cm = value_commitment.cm(params).into_xy();
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(3, "value commitment/commitment point/x/input variable"), expected_value_cm.0);
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assert_eq!(cs.get_input(4, "value commitment/commitment point/y/input variable"), expected_value_cm.1);
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let note = ::primitives::Note {
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let note = ::primitives::Note {
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value: value_commitment.value,
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value: value_commitment.value,
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