Scare Crowe 2a709f28fa Auto exploit mitigation feature
* 0day explit mitigation
* Memory corruption prevention
* Privilege escalation prevention
* Buffer over flow prevention
* File System corruption defense
* Thread escape prevention

This may very well be the most intensive inclusion to BrooklynR. This will not be part of an x86 suite nor it will be released as tool kit. The security core toolkit will remain part of kernel base.
2021-11-13 09:26:51 +05:00

52 lines
1.5 KiB
C

/******************************************************************************
* nmi.h
*
* NMI callback registration and reason codes.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005, Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
*/
#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_NMI_H__
#define __XEN_PUBLIC_NMI_H__
#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
/*
* NMI reason codes:
* Currently these are x86-specific, stored in arch_shared_info.nmi_reason.
*/
/* I/O-check error reported via ISA port 0x61, bit 6. */
#define _XEN_NMIREASON_io_error 0
#define XEN_NMIREASON_io_error (1UL << _XEN_NMIREASON_io_error)
/* PCI SERR reported via ISA port 0x61, bit 7. */
#define _XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr 1
#define XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr (1UL << _XEN_NMIREASON_pci_serr)
/* Unknown hardware-generated NMI. */
#define _XEN_NMIREASON_unknown 2
#define XEN_NMIREASON_unknown (1UL << _XEN_NMIREASON_unknown)
/*
* long nmi_op(unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
* NB. All ops return zero on success, else a negative error code.
*/
/*
* Register NMI callback for this (calling) VCPU. Currently this only makes
* sense for domain 0, vcpu 0. All other callers will be returned EINVAL.
* arg == pointer to xennmi_callback structure.
*/
#define XENNMI_register_callback 0
struct xennmi_callback {
unsigned long handler_address;
unsigned long pad;
};
DEFINE_GUEST_HANDLE_STRUCT(xennmi_callback);
/*
* Deregister NMI callback for this (calling) VCPU.
* arg == NULL.
*/
#define XENNMI_unregister_callback 1
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_NMI_H__ */