The previous criteria was to stop searching for more leaf keys as soon as we found a batch of keys with no transactions, but it seems that there are occasions when subsequent batches do actually contain transactions. The solution/workaround is to require 5 consecutive empty batches before giving up. There may be ways to improve this further by copying approaches from other BIP32 implementations, but this is a quick fix that should solve the problem for now.
This involved a small refactor of the ACCT code to expose findSecretA() in a more generic way. Bitcoin is disabled for refunding and redeeming as it uses a legacy approach that we no longer support. The {blockchain} URL parameter has also been removed from the redeem and refund APIs, because it can be obtained from the ACCT via the code hash in the AT.
The "dust" threshold is around 1 DOGE - meaning orders below this size cannot be refunded or redeemed. The simplest solution is to prevent orders of this size being placed to begin with.
Recently we have stopped including the version number in the zip and exe files uploaded to github, as this allows us to use the "https://github.com/Qortal/*/releases/latest/download/*" redirect for all 3 files when linking from the qortal.org website. Previously, it could only be done for the JAR since this was the only file that didn't contain a version number. This avoids having to update the website every time we distribute a new release.
Note that this currently requires that the Qortal-x.y.z.exe file created by AdvancedInstaller is renamed to qortal.exe before running ./build-release.sh. If you forget to rename, the script will exit with a warning that the file couldn't be found.
This is probably our number one reliability issue at the moment, and has been a problem for a very long time.
The existing CHECKPOINT_LOCK would prevent new connections being created when we are checkpointing or about to checkpoint. However, in many cases we obtain the db connection early on and then don't perform any queries until later. An example would be in synchronization, where the connection is obtained at the start of the process and then retained throughout the sync round. My suspicion is that we were encountering this series of events:
1. Open connection to database
2. Call maybeCheckpoint() and confirm there are no active transactions
3. An existing connection starts a new transaction
4. Checkpointing is performed, but deadlocks due to the in-progress transaction
This potential fix includes preparedStatement.execute() in the CHECKPOINT_LOCK, to block any new transactions being started when we are locked for checkpointing. It is fairly high risk so we need to build some confidence in this before releasing it.
Rename to zh_SC for better distinguish between zh_SC (Simple Chinese)and zh_TC(Traditional Chinese)
Rephrase some of the words for better understanding.
